With the West, Iliescu didn't score progress, with Russia he didn't dare

The scandal of the red line has again stirred polemics linked to the foreign policy enforced by the former administration, which political analysts consider "hesitating" in ties both with the West and with the Russian Federation. The oscillating attitude Bucharest Government adopted during the Bosnia crisis and the delay in its accepting European and American requests on the normalisation of relations with neighbouring countries and ethnical minorities are the main "errors" of Romanian foreign policy towards the West, according to Valentin Stan, a specialist in international relations. Though it observed the embargo imposed on Yugoslavia through the UN resolution during the war in Bosnia, Romania constantly criticised it, as it also opposed air attacks against Serbs of Bosnia. "Criticism against the embargo was not grounded, because the sanctions strategy brought Milosevic at the negotiations' table and made it possible for the Dayton accord to be signed," says Valentin Stan. He maintains that Romania was unacceptably late in signing the treaty with Hungary, declining to accept the introduction of recommendation 1201 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, on national minorities' rights, although sorting out problems with neighbouring countries is a condition for a country's EU and NATO joining. The treaty should have been signed, according to Stan, in early 1995. In the spring of 1995, Bill Clinton wrote a letter to President Ion Iliescu, requesting the Romanian leader to sign the treaty, but Bucharest administration refused, for a year and a half, to bow to the Americans' request. Finally, the treaty was signed in 1996 and it included in its annex the obligation to abide by recommendation 1201. "It was a complete failure in negotiations. The explanation provided by authorities, according to which it was agreed for the recommendation to be included only in the annex, is an insult against the Romanian people, because the annex is a constituent part of the treaty." Stan states that the same "hesitating" attitude characterised the former ruling in its relations to Moscow. Its failing to conclude a treaty with the Russian Federation can be easily accounted for, in Stan's opinion, by the fact that the political elite could not afford being accused of being a Moscow feud. Because of bad relationships with Russia, Romania was ousted from negotiations between Russia, Moldova and Ukraine on the Dnestr situation and the deterioration of these relationships that, according to Stan, could occur following the red line scandal, will not help Romania in its bid to join NATO. Former President Iliescu suffers, Stan thinks, from an "ancestral fear" of being accused of having "special" relations with Moscow. He states that this fear drove him to publish last year, in "Washington Post," an article that called for blocking Russia' access to Southeastern Europe. The article, which appeared during NATO's intervention in Yugoslavia that PDSR was criticising in Bucharest, comes against the US policy as well, as the States want to get Russia involved in dealing with problems of the area. Political analyst Dan Pavel thinks Romania's foreign policy was characterised, until 1996, by "hesitations and minimal gestures." Pavel maintains that former President Iliescu understood the importance of some gestures, such as the necessity of Romania's joining the Council of Europe or the Peace Partnership, but only acted at a "minimal level," under the impulse of "imperatives of the moment." He states that should Iliescu regain power, this would not stop Romania from EU and NATO joining, but it would not speed up the process, either.